In 1998, Medicare began phasing in a new prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). This paper measures facility-level changes in nurse staffing and quality at freestanding SNFs from 1997 (pre-PPS) to 2001 (post-PPS). Findings show a positive but small association between changes in payment levels and changes in nurse staffing. Among for-profits, the elimination of cost reimbursement is associated with a large drop in nurse staffing. Additionally, the elimination of cost reimbursement is associated with worsening in one of four measures of quality of care; however, the quality results are not statistically robust.
Poor quality care in nursing facilities regularly resurfaces as a major public policy concern in the United States (Institute of Medicine 1986 Medicine , 2001 . The American Health Care Association, a nursing facility trade group, has argued that increasing government payment levels is the best way to improve the quality of care (American Health Care Association 1999). Consumer groups, on the other hand, tend to favor regulatory approaches, such as mandated minimum staffing levels (National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform 2002). Researchers also have cited a lack of physician oversight, supply caps, the dominance of for-profit providers, and the dominance of government payers (Chou 2002; Nyman 1985; Office of Inspector General 1999) .
This debate raises three questions regarding payments to nursing facilities. First, if government payments to nursing facilities are increased, to what extent are staffing levels and/or quality of care improved? If higher payment levels have little or no effect on staffing and quality, that would argue in favor of focusing on other ways to in-crease staffing and improve quality. The second question is what features of the payment system, besides payment levels per se, affect staffing levels and quality. This research focuses on the difference between retrospective cost reimbursement and prospective payment, with the key distinction being the extent to which payments are determined by actual costs incurred. The broader question, beyond the scope of this research, is how government payment policy should be combined with regulatory and other approaches in order to ensure high-quality care for nursing facility residents.
Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), implemented in 1998, can help answer those questions. In freestanding SNFs, around one-tenth of all resident days are paid for by Medicare. The SNF PPS increased mean Medicare payment rates (from $269 per resident per day in 1997 to $316 in 2001) and also eliminated cost reimbursement. To help interpret SNFs' responses to these changes, I develop a model of nursing home behavior in which a nursing facility selects the level of staffing in response to payment policy. This model focuses on the effects of payment changes on staffing, and distinguishes between the effects of changes in payment levels and the effects of prospective payment. The model also contrasts the responses of altruistic facilities versus profitoriented facilities. I then perform an empirical analysis in which I use the implementation of Medicare's SNF PPS as a source of variation in both payment levels and the degree to which payments are based on costs incurred. Facility-level changes in the outcomes of interest (staffing and quality of care) are regressed on changes in payments.
Briefly, I find that increases in payment levels are associated with slight increases in nurse staffing levels. The elimination of cost reimbursement, on the other hand, is strongly associated with reduced staffing at for-profit facilities and associated with a reduction in one of the three quality measures examined (though the quality results are not statistically robust). This finding is consistent with the lack of a strong consumer demand response to staffing levels and with forprofit providers not having a high level of altruistic concern for their residents' well-being.
This research makes several contributions to the literature on nursing facility payments and payment systems in general. First, I use the implementation of the SNF PPS as an exogenous source of facility-level variation in both payment levels and prospective payment. This mitigates the potential bias from omitted variables that can arise in a cross-sectional analysis, such as a comparison of payment systems across states. Second, I build a rich data set that includes preand post-PPS measures of payments, staffing, and quality of care for the universe of freestanding SNFs. These data allow me to calculate payment impacts at the SNF level, rather than aggregated across all SNFs; this is important because the impact of the SNF PPS varied widely across SNFs. Furthermore, the staffing data allow me to examine changes in labor input levels, which can shed light on what might otherwise be a ''black box'' interposed between payments and quality. Finally, this analysis extends the research on Medicare hospital payments to a new provider setting. This can support the development of payment policies that are tailored to particular provider types.
In the next section, I describe Medicare's changing role in financing nursing facilities; then I review previous research on hospitals' and nursing facilities' responses to payment changes. The following sections describe in detail the conceptual framework and the empirical strategy. I then describe the data sources and the building of the analytic data set, and I present the results and discuss alternative empirical specifications. Finally, I offer some comments on the policy implications of the results.
Changes in Medicare Payments to Nursing Facilities
During the 1970s and 1980s, Medicaid and privatepay residents together accounted for nearly all of the nursing facility population, and Medicare played only a small role in financing nursing facilities (Hing 1981; Hing, Sekscenski and Strahan 1989) . At that time, economic research on payments to nursing facilities focused on Medicaid payment policy and the interaction between Medicaid demand and private demand (Gertler 1985a (Gertler , 1985b Nyman 1985) .
From the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, Medicare's role in financing nursing home care expanded, as an increasing number of nursing facilities became certified as SNFs and, therefore, eligible to receive Medicare reimbursement. Over this period, the Medicare resident fraction (i.e., fraction of nursing facility residents with Medicare as the primary payer) grew substantially (Gabrel and Jones 2000; Hing, Sekscenski and Strahan 1989) . While Medicare-covered SNF days were increasing, so, too, were Medicare payments per resident per day, resulting in rapid spending growth (Committee on Ways and Means 2000). Congress, in an effort to rein in Medicare SNF spending, included a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97) that required the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to phase in a SNF PPS beginning in 1998. Under the SNF PPS, the unit of payment is the day (as opposed to the discharge or the episode), and payments are adjusted for case mix and a local wage index. Medicare's payments per SNF day dropped somewhat in 1999, but then rebounded as a result of ''givebacks'' (i.e., payment increases) legislated in the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 and the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000.
The SNF PPS dramatically altered SNFs' economic incentives. Under the old cost-reimbursement system, SNFs had little incentive to limit the costs of providing care to their Medicare residents as long as those costs could be allocated to Medicare. The new Medicare PPS gives SNFs a strong incentive to reduce nursing costs (and most other costs) per resident day. Thus the system is high-powered with respect to nursing costs, pharmaceuticals, and most other costs per day. (A payment system is referred to as highpowered if payments are not based on the level of costs incurred, and low-powered if payments are based largely or wholly on costs incurred [Newhouse 2002 ].) On the other hand, SNFs are paid by Medicare per day, rather than per stay or episode, which makes the SNF PPS lowpowered with respect to length of stay.
Previous Research
This research builds on three strands of literature: the first on Medicare's acute care hospital PPS, the second on Medicaid payments to nursing facilities, and the third on the new SNF PPS. In 1983, Medicare began phasing out its retrospective cost-based payment system for acute care hospitals and replacing it with a new case mix-adjusted, stay-based PPS. Ellis and McGuire (1986) made a useful analogy between demand-side cost sharing (through coinsurance and deductibles) and supply-side cost sharing (through prospective payment); both create incentives to reduce the amount of health care consumed. Early studies reported that the hospital PPS reduced growth in costs per case, but did not appear to significantly worsen health outcomes among Medicare hospital patients (Feder, Hadley and Zuckerman 1987; Rogers et al. 1990 ). Later researchers attempted to disentangle the effects of changes in payment levels from the effects of prospective payment per se. Cutler (1995) reported that drops in payment levels due to the acute care hospital PPS were not associated with any mortality differences at one year, but were associated with a compression of mortality into the period soon after admission with no long-term differences. He did not find that the changes to marginal payment had any effect on mortality, though he did report an increase in readmission.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, several papers examined the effects of nursing facility pay-ment policy on quality in the context of supply caps and excess demand (Gertler 1992; Nyman 1985) . Since those papers were written, there has been a sustained decline in nursing facility occupancy rates, from 91.8% in 1985 to 86.6% in 1999 (Hing, Sekscenski and Strahan 1989; Jones 2002) . This has shifted attention away from excess demand models and led researchers to test for a positive association between Medicaid payment levels and quality. There also has been increased attention to the importance of payment methodology, in particular the distinction between prospective and retrospective payment. Cohen and Spector (1996) did not find an association between state Medicaid payment levels and registered nurse (RN) staffing, but did find a positive association between the use of a retrospective cost-based payment methodology and RN staffing. Grabowski (2001) found similar resultsno association between Medicaid payment levels and RN staffing, but a positive association between retrospective cost-based reimbursement and RN staffing. Grabowski also found an association between quality of care (measured by pressure sores) and both Medicaid payment levels and the use of a retrospective cost-based payment methodology.
Research on the Medicare SNF PPS has shown that SNFs substantially altered their rehabilitation services post-PPS (Wodchis 2004) . Freestanding SNFs, particularly for-profits, responded to the elimination of cost reimbursement by dramatically reducing the level of rehabilitation therapy provided (White 2003) . Konetzka et al. (2004) examined the effects of the SNF PPS on staffing and deficiencies, and attempted to disentangle payment level effects from prospective payment effects. Their findings suggest that SNFs reduced their nurse staffing in response to the PPS, but their analysis and their identification strategy are limited by a lack of facility-specific measures of changes in payment levels. The findings presented subsequently reinforce the key findings in Cohen and Spector (1996) , Grabowski (2001) , and White (2003) -namely that payment methodology, not just payment rates, affects staffing and outcomes.
Conceptual Framework
In this section I present a simple one-payer model of nursing facility behavior, in which a nursing facility selects the level of resources to devote to patient care in response to the payment system. This model, which is similar to Hodgkin and McGuire's (1994) model of a hospital's choice of treatment intensity, is used to distinguish between two types of payment effects-a ''payment level effect'' and a ''prospective payment effect''-and is employed as the basis for the empirical analysis that follows. The level of resources devoted to patient care, measured by costs per resident day (c), is assumed to be under the nursing facility's control, and can be thought of as reflecting the nurse staffing level or, more generally, as the quality of care. (Note that costs per resident day here refers to the costs of the labor and other inputs used by the facility in providing care, not the payments made to the facility.) I show that the nursing facility's choice of costs per resident day depends on the payment system, the facility's degree of altruistic concern for residents' health status, and the responsiveness of individuals' demand for nursing facility care with respect to the quality of that care.
The key equations are the following:
Revenue (R) per resident per day is a function of a flat-rate component (a) and a cost reimbursement component (b). Together, a and b characterize the payment system. In a retrospective cost-reimbursement system, a equals 0 and b equals 1. In a cost-plus system, b is greater than 1. In a pure flat-rate payment system, a equals the flat rate and b equals 0. In a mixed system, a . 0 and 0 , b , 1. Profit per resident per day (p) is simply the excess of revenues over costs (R À c). The health benefit to residents (H) is an increasing function of costs and is measured in the same units as costs (dollars per resident per day). Residents are all assumed to be identical in terms of their revenue function and health benefits func-tion. The number of residents in the nursing facility (N) is a non-decreasing function of costs incurred per resident day. N9 reflects the increase in the number of individuals demanding nursing facility care in response to an increase in the resources devoted to patient care. If N9 is greater than zero, then there is some ''demand response,'' meaning that the nursing facility has some spare capacity, and that the demand for nursing facility care varies positively with the quality of that care. The nursing facility's utility (U) equals the product of the number of residents and a weighted average of profits and health benefits to residents, with g representing the weight (from 0 to 1) placed on residents' health benefits. A facility that places more emphasis on resident well-being and less emphasis on profits would have a larger g. U reflects the objective function of the decision maker who determines the level of costs to incur. In reality, that decision making is likely to be shared among managers, owners, boards of directors, and unions. A revenue constraint (equation 6) is imposed, meaning that costs may not exceed revenues, and a minimum level of costs, c (equation 7), also is imposed. The minimum cost constraint reflects the fact that even a pure profit-maximizing nursing facility has to provide some staffing, due to regulatory requirements and the threat of litigation.
Using this framework, one can now define the two payment effects of interest. The payment level effect is the effect of a change in a on facilities' choice of costs to incur. The prospective payment effect is the effect on facilities' choice of costs of a revenue-neutral shift from cost reimbursement (b ¼ 1) to prospective payment (b ¼ 0). A revenue-neutral shift is one that eliminates cost reimbursement but, from that facility's perspective, leaves revenues per resident day unchanged. I use the first-order condition (FOC) to explore the payment-level and prospective-payment effects, and how these effects vary with the weight placed on residents' well-being (g), and the demand response (N9).
The FOC from equation 5 is:
This FOC, which is explored in more detail in an endnote, 1 implies that the nursing facility's response to payment changes will depend on the degree of the facility's altruistic concern for residents' health status (g) and the demand response (N9). Intuitively, a nursing facility trades off the benefits and drawbacks of incurring higher costs. The benefits of incurring higher costs can include increased payments (in the case of cost reimbursement or a mixed payment system), increased health benefits (which may or may not matter to the facility, depending on g), and an increase in the number of patients (in the case of a non-zero demand response). The drawback to increasing costs incurred is a reduction in profits in the case of prospective payment or a mixed payment system; those profits may or may not matter to the facility, depending on g. Increasing costs may not be possible if the revenue constraint binds.
The FOC implies that one should expect a payment level effect (i.e., an increase in costs in response to an increase in payment levels) in only two situations: providers are altruistic and the revenue constraint binds, or there is a positive demand response. On the other hand, one should expect to observe a prospective payment effect (i.e., a drop in costs in response to a revenueneutral switch from cost reimbursement to prospective payment) in cases where providers are not purely altruistic. This suggests that nursing facilities' responses to the new Medicare payment system might vary with market conditions (i.e., the degree of demand response) and with ownership status (i.e., for-profit vs. nonprofit).
Empirical Strategy
I measure changes from 1997 (pre-PPS) to 2001 (post-PPS) in facility-level payments, staffing, and quality of care. 2 Changes in staffing and quality of care are regressed on changes in payment levels and the Medicare resident fraction. The Medicare resident fraction measures exposure at the facility level to the change from cost reimbursement to prospective payment and is used to measure the prospective payment effect; the change in payment levels is used to measure the payment level effect. Medicare residents make up a small share of residents in most freestanding SNFs, but the changes in Medicare's payments were substantial enough that it is plausible to test for facility-level changes in staffing and quality. As shown in Table 1 , among freestanding SNFs in 1997 the mean Medicare resident fraction was 9%, and around two-thirds had a Medicare resident fraction between 5% and 15%. Because Medicare payments per resident day generally are substantially higher than Medicaid or self-pay payments, Medicare accounts for a larger share of facilities' revenues than patients.
Modeling facility-level changes produces estimates similar to the within-facility effects from a panel data analysis with facility-level fixed effects. By using facility-level changes as the dependent variables, the analysis implicitly controls for omitted time-invariant facility characteristics. A similar approach was used in Shen's (2003) analysis of Medicare payments to short-stay hospitals. I exclude hospital-based SNFs from the analysis because they differ from freestanding SNFs on several important dimensions, and previous research has shown that they responded very differently to the new PPS (White 2003) .
Staffing and quality of care are measured at the facility level and, therefore, reflect the care SNFs provide both to their Medicare and non-Medicare residents. The use of facility-level outcomes raises the issue of how nursing home administrators choose staffing and quality levels, and whether they make payer-specific decisions versus facilitywide decisions. Is staffing set for each payer's residents based on each payer's policies, or is staffing set facilitywide based on some combination of the various payment policies? I use facility-level staffing and quality measures rather than measures specific to Medicare residents primarily because of data limitations. (Medicarespecific nurse staffing data are not available either pre-or post-PPS, and Medicare-specific quality data are not available for the pre-PPS period.) In describing the empirical strategy, I treat staffing decisions as payer-specific, but this is clearly an oversimplification. I subsequently show that the empirical strategy does not depend on staffing being payer-specific and is consistent with both payer-specific decision making and facilitywide decision making.
The goal in specifying the estimating equation is to identify the effects of the change in Medicare's payment policies on changes in the facilitylevel outcomes of interest (e.g., nurse full-time equivalents [FTEs] per resident per day). The facility-level outcome for facility j, Y j , can be expressed as follows:
where Y M, j is the outcome among Medicare residents, Y O, j is the outcome among other (non-Medicare) residents, and M j is the Medicare resident fraction (i.e., the fraction of residents with Medicare as primary payer).
With the implementation of the SNF PPS, both the flat-rate component (a) and the cost reimbursement component (b) of Medicare payments were changed. The effect of this change can be expressed as follows:
where a PPS, j is the flat-rate component under the prospective payment system, and a CR, j is the flatrate component under cost reimbursement.
Recall that the payment level effect refers to the effect of a change in the flat-rate component, and the prospective payment effect refers to the effect of a revenue-neutral shift from cost reimbursement to prospective payment. To be revenue neutral, a shift from b ¼ 1 to b ¼ 0 would require that the flat-rate component change from 0 to R CR , where R CR equals revenue per resident per day under cost reimbursement and where the resident population is assumed constant. Then, the payment level effect and the prospective payment effect can be defined by expanding equation 14:
where the first term in square brackets captures the payment level effect and the second term captures the prospective payment effect. The first key assumption in specifying an estimating equation is that the marginal effect of a change in the flat-rate component is approximately constant. This allows equation 15 to be rewritten as:
where x j represents the payment level effect (@f j (a PPS, j , b PPS,j )/@a PPS, j ) and É j represents the prospective payment effect ( f j (R CR, j ,0) À f j (0,1)).
To estimate the payment level effect (x j ), I first calculate the ''Medicare payment impact'' (ÁP M, j ):
which equals the change from 1997 (pre-PPS) to 2001 (post-PPS) in Medicare payment per Medicare resident per day, adjusted for inflation and holding resident case mix constant (as subsequently described). I then calculate the ''overall payment impact'' (ÁP j ):
by multiplying the Medicare payment impact (ÁP M,j ) by the Medicare resident fraction in 1997 (M j ). This is equivalent to the change in the facility-level revenue constraint due to the new PPS, expressed in dollars per resident per day.
One key assumption in specifying the estimating equation is that the Medicare resident fraction, M j , can be treated reasonably as constant over time. 3 Then, the change from 1997 to 2001 in the facility-level outcome of interest, ÁY j , can be approximated as:
To estimate the prospective payment effect (É j ), I use each facility's Medicare resident fraction in 1997 (M j ).
The last key assumption I use is that, after including a set of controls, the change in outcomes among non-Medicare beneficiaries (ÁY O, j ) is uncorrelated with the Medicare resident fraction (M j ) and the overall payment impact (ÁP j ). Equation 19 then can be parameterized as:
where X j is a set of controls and e is a residual. Note that the coefficients on the control variables (state, ownership, and competition) capture differential trends in the outcomes of interest (not differences in levels). I have assumed, so far, that facilities make payer-specific decisions regarding staffing and quality. Note, though, that the specification in equation 20 is also consistent with facilitywide decision making. Suppose that facilities choose the outcomes of interest (Y) for all residents based on a facility-level ''average'' payment policy (i.e., averaged over a facility's residents). In its simplest formulation, this average payment policy would consist of an average flat-rate component (a) and an average cost reimbursement compo-nent (b). The overall payment impact (ÁP j ), by construction, equals the facility-level change in the average flat-rate component, and the Medicare resident fraction (M j ) equals the (negative of the) facility-level change in the average cost reimbursement component. The key behavioral parameters (x and É), therefore, may be interpreted either as reflecting payer-specific decision making (Medicare payment policy affects staffing and quality of care for Medicare residents), or as reflecting facilitywide decision making (Medicare payment policy affects staffing and quality of care for all residents).
Based on the predictions from the theoretical model, I expect the payment level effect and prospective payment effect to vary with market conditions and ownership status. The estimating equations, therefore, include interactions of the key variables (overall payment impact and Medicare resident fraction) with a measure of local market competition, and a dummy variable that indicates nonprofit status. I include the measure of local market competition to test for the possibility that SNFs respond differently to payment changes depending on the level of competition they face. Specifically, I am testing whether SNFs that face greater competition exhibit a stronger payment level effect, as suggested by the theoretical model. The notion is that if a SNF increases its staffing per resident and its quality of care, then the SNF may be able to increase the number of residents it attracts. I expect that the link between staffing per resident and the number of residents might be stronger in more competitive areas; this link would occur if patients needing SNF care in more competitive areas chose among SNFs at least partly on the basis of quality of care.
Including the interactions of the nonprofit dummy with the other key variables in the model also is based on the predictions of the theoretical model. The model predicts that more altruistic providers, compared with more profit-oriented providers, will exhibit stronger payment level effects and weaker prospective payment effects. The ''dummy variable'' approach to analyzing differences between for-profit and nonprofit SNFs allows a straightforward specification with easily interpretable results, but potentially ignores strategic interactions among different ownership forms (Grabowski and Hirth 2003) . The controls include a full set of state dummies, a dummy for nonprofit ownership, and a measure of market-level compe-tition among SNFs. Because the dependent variables measure changes over time, the inclusion of these controls allows for differential state-, ownership-, and competition-specific time trends. One concern in estimating the payment effects is that the implementation of the SNF PPS might cause, or simply coincide with, changes in the composition of nursing facility residents. To account for such changes, pre-and post-PPS staffing and quality measures are adjusted for resident case mix, as subsequently described. Medicare payments to SNFs under the PPS are determined by the facility's case mix, a wage index at the level of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and, during a 3-year transition period, a facility-specific measure of historical costs (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001). For each SNF I want to calculate the change in payments attributable to the PPS formula, holding case mix and staffing constant. Because the data collection system for SNF case-mix classification was not in place in 1997, I do not have a direct measure of 1997 case mix. Therefore, I use data from 1998 through 2001 to map acute care hospital primary diagnoses onto SNF case-mix categories (i.e., among all individuals nationwide who had acute care hospital stays with a particular primary diagnosis and who had a subsequent SNF stay, I find the fraction as-signed to each SNF case-mix category). For each SNF, I then simulate case mix (i.e., the fraction of residents in each case-mix category) in 1997 using this diagnosis-case mix map. I follow by calculating the simulated payment rate in 2001 using the 1997 simulated case mix, a weighted average of the payment rates in effect for each case-mix category in 2001, and the 2001 MSA-level wage adjuster (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001). The MSA wage index, which is calculated by CMS based on hospital cost reports, is the primary determinant of the simulated 2001 payment rate.
Market Competition
The Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences at Dartmouth Medical School has created a geographic classification system that maps zip codes to hospital service areas (HSAs). There are 3,436 HSAs in the United States where each HSA corresponds roughly to the area served predominantly by a single acute care hospital. For each HSA, I calculate a SNF Herfindahl index based on total nursing facility patient days in 1997. This Herfindahl index, which reflects both freestanding and hospital-based SNFs, reflects the HSA-level market concentration in the provision of nursing facility services. The Herfindahl index is assumed to be inversely related to the degree of demand response to the level of costs incurred.
Medicare Resident Fraction, Staffing, and Quality Data
Total resident days and Medicare resident fractions for calendar years 1997 and 2001 are calculated from a March 2004 SNF cost report file. 4 The CMS Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) data are used to measure staffing levels and quality of care. The most recent OSCAR data for each SNF also were used to identify ownership status and whether the SNF was a member of a nursing home chain. OSCAR data include information on FTEs by type of staff and resident population (e.g., number of residents who are bedfast). 5 The OSCAR data also include ''deficiencies,'' which are violations of standards of care as reported by state inspectors. To make the staffing model results more easily interpretable, I scale the staffing FTEs by wages and fringe benefit costs, using separate national wage rates for certified nurse aides (CNAs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and registered nurses (RNs), and using a national nurse-specific fringe rate. The staffing measures, therefore, represent staffing costs per resident per day. 6 Staffing costs (dollars per resident per day) are case mix-adjusted for resident characteristics using ordinary least squares (OLS) models. These models are estimated with data from all OSCAR surveys of all freestanding SNFs from 1996 through 2002 (N ¼ 68,437) . Staffing costs by type of staff are modeled as functions of the fractions of residents dependent in each ADL (bathing, dressing, transferring, toileting, eating), the fraction who are incontinent, and the fractions receiving a number of special treatments (the models are not shown here but details and the estimated coefficients are available upon request). The coefficients in these models appear to be reasonable, though R-squares are not high, ranging from .0364 for the CNA model to .0888 for the RN model. Reassuringly, the resident characteristics that are estimated in these models to have the greatest impact on staffing costs have been identified previously as being associated with higher nurse staffing costs and are used in Medicare's case-mix adjustment system for SNFs (Fries et al. 1994) . For each type of staffing, adjusted staffing costs are calculated by adding the residuals from the case-mix models to the overall means.
The OSCAR surveys occur at approximately yearly intervals and are conducted by state inspectors. The surveys measure resident census and staffing levels at a point in time and are, therefore, subject to measurement error. To increase the precision of the staffing and census measures, I allow multiple surveys to be included in the calculation of the pre-and post-PPS measures of SNF-level staffing and quality. At the SNF level, I calculate pre-PPS staffing and quality measures averaging all surveys occurring from July 1996 through June 1998; similarly, post-PPS staffing and quality measures are calculated using all surveys occurring from July 2000 through June 2002. Typically, one to three surveys are used here to calculate the pre-and post-PPS measures. Surveys with unreasonable staffing data are excluded from the analysis. 7 Researchers have devoted substantial effort in recent years to developing valid measures of the quality of care in nursing homes (CMS 2003) . Currently, the key data source for generating quality measures in the nursing facility setting is the Minimum Data Set (MDS), a detailed resident-level assessment of health and functional status. Unfortunately, MDS data were not made available nationally in electronic form until after the implementation of the SNF PPS; this prevents me from using MDS-based quality measures in this analysis. Instead, I use facilitylevel measures from the OSCAR. These OS-CAR-based measures are poor substitutes for modern MDS-based measures, but are some of the only facility-level quality measures available for the period analyzed here.
To assess changes in the quality of care, I use pressure sores as a measure of health outcomes, and two process-based quality measures-use of restraints and survey deficiencies. Pressure sores, also referred to as decubitus ulcers or bedsores, are defined by the Institute of Medicine (2001) as ''bruises or open sores . . . from pressure or friction on the skin.'' Because they can cause serious medical complications and are generally preventable, pressure sores are commonly used as indicators of the quality of care in nursing facilities (Chou 2002; Cohen and Spector 1996; Grabowski 2001) . The Institute of Medicine also cites the use of unnecessary physical and chemical restraints as common sources of poor quality care in nursing facilities (Institute of Medicine 2001). The OSCAR resident census data are used to calculate the fraction of residents with new pressure sores and new restraints. 8 Survey deficiencies, which reflect the number of violations of federal regulatory standards as reported by state inspectors during annual certification surveys, are used as another measure of quality of care. Researchers have expressed concern regarding the use of survey deficiencies as a measure of quality of care in light of the significant variability across states in the interpretation of federal regulatory standards (Institute of Medicine 2001). This concern is lessened in the current research because I use facility-level changes in survey deficiencies as the outcome of interest, and all models include state-level dummy variables as controls. These measures of quality of care are adjusted for case mix using OLS models analogous to those used to adjust staffing levels. The R-squares for the case-mix models are lower for the quality measures than for staffing costs, ranging from .0212 for new pressure sores to .0454 for deficiencies.
Excluded Facilities and Missing Data
There were 18,210 SNFs that submitted Medicare claims in 1997 or 2001, including freestanding SNFs, hospital-based SNFs, and hospital swing-bed units. Excluded from the analysis are SNFs that: did not have claims in both 1997 and 2001 (3,695 SNFs), were swing-bed units (1,099) , were hospital-based (1,615 SNFs), or were located in Puerto Rico or a territory (three SNFs). SNFs also were excluded if there was missing or invalid data (476 SNFs had missing OSCAR data, 1,541 SNFs had missing cost report data, and 33 had other missing data). The 9,748 freestanding SNFs included in the analysis accounted for 3.49 million Medicare SNF stays in 1997 and 2001 combined. The 2,050 SNFs excluded due to missing or invalid data accounted for .43 million Medicare SNF stays. Compared to the freestanding SNFs included in the analysis, SNFs excluded due to missing data appear to be smaller, have lower occupancy, and lower Medicare resident fractions, and similar in other respects. Table 2 shows that the Medicare and overall payment impacts varied greatly across individual SNFs. The Medicare payment impact (change in Medicare payment per Medicare resident per day) has an interquartile range of over $100. The overall payment impact (i.e., the Medicare payment impact multiplied by the Medicare resi-dent fraction in 1997) has a much narrower range because the Medicare resident fraction is generally small. Still, the overall payment impact interquartile range is around $7, which is over 5% of the average cost per day of nursing facility care ($128 in 1999) (National Center for Health Statistics 2002) . This shows that the changes in Medicare payment levels varied widely across SNFs, and that the magnitudes are large enough that it is plausible to test for associated changes in staffing and quality. Table 3 presents the staffing results. The overall payment impact is associated with increases in CNA, LPN, RN, and all-nurse staffing. For a forprofit facility, an increase of $100 in payments per resident per day is associated with an increase in nurse staffing costs of $12.09 per resident per day. This payment level effect does not appear to vary with market competitiveness or with nonprofit status. To help interpret the payment level effect, note that the mean overall payment impact ($3.08) would be associated with an increase in nurse staffing costs of $.37 per resident per day (i.e., [$12.09/100] * $3.08).
Results
The Medicare resident fraction in 1997, which measures the prospective payment effect, has a strong negative association with changes in CNA, LPN, RN, and all-nurse staffing. The prospective payment effect is substantially smaller among nonprofit facilities (note the large positive coefficient on the interaction of the Medicare resident fraction in 1997 and the nonprofit dummy). Multiplying the mean Medicare resident fraction in 1997 (9.0%) by the all-nurse staffing coefficient on Medicare resident fraction (À$42.07) yields a change in nurse staffing costs of À$3.79 per resident per day.
To provide an alternative sense of the magnitudes involved, the staffing results can be restated in terms of nurse staff minutes per resident per day. The mean nurse staffing costs in 1997 ($61.89) is equivalent to around 210 minutes of nursing staff time per resident per day. In the all-nurse staffing regression, the coefficient on the simulated overall payment impact ($12.09) implies that the mean overall payment impact ($3.08) is associated with an increase in nurse staff time per resident per day of just over one minute (i.e., $3.08 * [$12.09/100] * [210/ $61.89]). The coefficient on Medicare resident fraction (À$42.07) implies that the mean Medicare resident fraction in 1997 (9.0%) is associated with a drop in nurse staff time per resident per day of almost 13 minutes (i.e., 9.0% * [À$42.07] * [210/$61.89]).
The quality results, shown in Table 4 , are less precisely estimated than the staffing results, and some are counterintuitive. The Medicare resident fraction is associated with a statistically significant increase in the number of deficiencies, which is consistent with predictions and with the staffing results (assuming staffing and deficiencies are inversely related). Surprisingly, though, this result is reversed in the less competitive markets (i.e., markets with a high Herfindahl index). In less competitive markets, the overall payment impact is associated with a reduction in the fraction of residents in restraints, but in more competitive markets this effect is reversed; this last result is counterintuitive. Overall, these results suggest that nonprofit nursing facilities showed some improvements in quality relative to for-profit facilities over the period analyzed (note the negative coefficients on the nonprofit dummy in two of three models). The only quality results with pvalues less than .01 are the nonprofit dummy in the restraints model (which reflects a differential time trend) and the Medicare resident fraction in the deficiencies model. If a Bonferroni correction is applied to the quality regression results, only the association between the nonprofit dum- my and the fraction of residents in restraints remains statistically significant at the 5% level. One potentially serious concern with this analysis is that changes in state Medicaid payments over the time period analyzed might drive the observed staffing changes. This concern is justified given that the BBA97 overhauled Medicare's SNF payments and, at the same time, repealed the Boren amendment (the Boren amendment limited states' leeway in constraining Medicaid nursing facility spending). Researchers recently examined trends in Medicaid payments from 1998 to 2002 (Grabowski et al. 2004) . They found that there was moderate variation across states in changes in Medicaid payment levels, and that in general Medicaid payment rates rose fairly steadily over this period. Perhaps more importantly, they found no major shifts over this period in Medicaid payment methods (e.g. from cost reimbursement to prospective payment). In the models presented here, none of the coefficients on the state dummies is statistically significant, which is consistent with the relative stability of Medicaid payments.
The staffing results may underestimate the payment level effect if SNFs significantly delayed changing their staffing levels in response to the new payment system. Such delays might be due either to simple inertia or to uncertainty regarding future changes in Medicare payment levels. Another concern is that changes in the composition of SNFs' resident populations might account for the observed changes in staffing levels and quality measures. The analysis attempts to account for these changes by adjusting staffing levels and quality measures based on resident characteristics as recorded in the OSCAR data. Additional analyses, available from the author, show that there were shifts in the composition of SNF resident populations from 1997 to 2001, but that these shifts were small relative to the observed changes in staffing levels. This analysis is limited by including only freestanding SNFs, and by including only SNFs that remained open throughout the period examined. Future research could focus on hospital-based SNFs and SNFs that opened and closed during this period. I experimented with several alternative empirical approaches and found that the staffing results are statistically quite robust, though the quality results are less robust. One alternative model that yielded substantially similar results used the actual Medicare and overall payment impacts rather than simulated payment impacts. I also found similar results using raw staffing measures (rather than those adjusted for case mix). Results also changed little if the models included a measure of the SNF-level difference from 1997 to 2001 in Medicare resident fraction.
Discussion
This paper analyzes the effects of Medicare's new SNF PPS on payments, payer mix, staffing, and quality of care at freestanding nursing facilities. I find that payment levels, which generally increased, had a positive but small association with changes in staffing levels. The magnitude of the payment level effect did not vary with ownership status or with market competitiveness, which does not support predictions from theory. I find a large prospective payment effect on staffing, indicating that the elimination of cost reimbursement was associated with a large decline in staffing. The magnitude of the prospective payment effect for staffing was much smaller among nonprofits compared to for-profits, which is consistent with theory. These two payment effects partially offset each other; thus, despite a sizable increase in Medicare payment levels, staffing remained fairly stable. This analysis has several limitations. Due to the data, only a limited set of quality measures are available over the period examined. Of the three quality measures used, two depend on unaudited facility-reported data, and the three together capture only narrow aspects of nursing home quality. Research on current trends in nursing home quality would benefit from the availability of much richer data sources. Also, the analysis identifies changes in staffing patterns between two points in time, but does not identify the timing of those changes. Examining longer time periods could produce different results if staffing responses lagged substantially behind payment changes.
It is informative to compare Medicare payment policy for SNFs versus acute care hospitals. Both the SNF PPS and the acute care hospital PPS mix high-and low-powered elements. The SNF PPS is high-powered with respect to nursing costs per resident day (meaning that payments do not vary with nursing costs), but is low-powered with respect to length of stay and rehabilitation therapy costs per day. The acute care hospital PPS is high-powered with respect to length of stay, but has low-powered elements (i.e., procedure-based diagnosis-related group [DRG] codes and outlier payments). The question is whether these two payment systems are appropriately ''powered,'' given the very different institutional settings. Most freestanding SNFs are for-profits and members of chains, while hospitals are predominately nonprofit and independent. The workforces also differ sharply, with freestanding SNFs having a largely low-paid workforce and little physician involvement.
The key insight from Ellis and McGuire (1986) is that if providers do not act as agents on their patients' behalf and have a strong profit orientation, then the optimal payment system would incorporate an element of cost reimbursement (i.e., would not be too high-powered). This argument is particularly salient in settings where there is little ''consumerism''-that is, the demand response to quality is weak. Nursing facilities, where most residents are immobile and/or mentally incapacitated, certainly fall into this category. This paper shows that nursing facilities, particularly those that are for-profit, respond strongly to a switch to a high-powered payment system. The policy question, then, is whether the SNF PPS is too high-powered.
Looking ahead, policymakers should be concerned about the possibility of a downward payment ratchet occurring in Medicare payments to SNFs. Medicare payments to most freestanding SNFs increased substantially with the new PPS, while nurse staffing levels were essentially unchanged. These factors have contributed to high Medicare margins for freestanding SNFs in recent years (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2004). High margins will tend to put pressure on policymakers to reduce payments which, as demonstrated in this research, will lead to decreases in staffing levels. The question is whether there is some mechanism in place to offset this downward ratchet-perhaps altruistic concern for residents' well-being on the part of providers, mandated minimum staffing levels, concern over litigation, or a ''consumerist'' demand response.
If policymakers want to add an element of cost reimbursement within the existing payment framework they have several options. One option would be to implement an outlier provision similar to the one used in Medicare's acute care hospital PPS. This approach would help shield nursing facilities from financial losses due to unusually costly individuals. 10 Another option would be to implement an explicit partial cost reimbursement system. Under such an arrangement, payments would equal a base amount plus some fraction of the difference between costs incurred and the base amount. The base amount could be determined in the same way the current prospective payments are determined (i.e., a base payment rate adjusted for local wages and facility-specific case mix). Such an arrange-ment would dampen nursing facilities' incentives to reduce costs because they would be reimbursed for some fraction of costs incurred. A third option would be to alter the case-mix classification system to better account for the costs of non-therapy ancillaries and nurse staffing. The outlier provision and partial cost reimbursement arrangements involve direct (though partial) cost reimbursement, in the sense that payments would be based partly on actual costs incurred. Casemix classification differs in that payments are adjusted for the expected costs of providing appropriate care without taking into account actual costs incurred.
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1 We can examine the implications of the FOC in four extreme cases, where each case is defined by the nursing facility's profit orientation (g) and the demand response (N9).
Case 1. Nursing facility is purely profit-oriented (g ¼ 0), and there is no demand response (N9 ¼ 0). In this case, the FOC simplifies to:
The FOC in this case is not particularly helpful, but the behavioral predictions are simple. First, note that under cost reimbursement (a ¼ 0, b ¼ 1), the FOC is satisfied and profits are 0 regardless of the level of costs. I will assume, then, that under cost reimbursement, costs are very high (technically, þ'). Under cost-plus (b . 1) costs are also þ', and in all other cases (b , 1) costs are at the minimum (c). The key features of this case are that costs bear no relationship to payment levels, and that a change from cost reimbursement or cost-plus to prospective payment will lead to a substantial reduction in costs (from very high to the minimum).
Case 2. Nursing facility is purely profit-oriented (g ¼ 0), and there is a positive demand response (N9 . 0). With some rearranging, the FOC in this case simplifies to:
where h represents the elasticity of the number of residents with respect to costs incurred. In this case, like in case 1, cost reimbursement (a ¼ 0, b ¼ 1) implies that the FOC is satisfied and profits are 0 regardless of the level of costs. This case differs from case 1 in the following way: under prospective payment (b ¼ 0) the level of costs may (depending on whether the minimum cost constraint binds) increase with the payment level (a).
Case 3. Nursing facility is purely altruistic (g ¼ 1), and there is no demand response (N9 ¼ 0). The FOC in this case simplifies to:
This FOC implies that costs will be determined either by the ''flat of the curve'' (no health returns to additional costs) or by the revenue constraint (assuming that the minimum cost constraint is set below the flat of the curve). In this case, a revenueneutral shift in b will not result in any change in costs. Under prospective payment there will, however, be a strong payment level effect (assuming that the payment level is below the flat of the curve and, therefore, that the revenue constraint binds).
Case 4. Nursing facility is purely altruistic (g ¼ 1), and there is a positive demand response (N9 . 0). The FOC in this case simplifies to:
This case is similar to case 3. A revenue-neutral shift in b will not affect costs, but under prospective payment there may be a strong payment level effect. 2 Although data are available for intermediate years between 1997 and 2001, I use a differences approach rather than a full panel data analysis. The SNF PPS was phased in over several years during which payments were based on a blend of each SNF's historical costs (trended forward using an inflation factor) and the case mix-adjusted ''federal'' rate. I chose to exclude the transition years for two reasons: payment impacts were relatively small during the intervening years (because of the blended payments), and I was not sure whether to expect SNF staffing responses to lag behind payment changes or precede payment changes (or both). 3 Additional analyses (not shown) suggest that the facility-level Medicare resident fractions were relatively stable over the period studied, and that although the Medicare resident fraction appears to respond to changes in Medicare payment levels, the magnitude of this response was relatively small. 4 Some nursing facilities have fiscal years that do not coincide with the calendar year. For these facilities, I calculated calendar-year measures by weighting each cost report by the fraction of the calendar year it includes. 5 The OSCAR data are generated in conjunction with the annual inspection process conducted by state regulators. These staffing and resident data are reported by the facilities and are not audited. between .1 and 4, LPNs per resident is between 0 and 1, RNs per resident is between 0 and 1, rehabilitation therapists per resident is between 0 and 1, total staff per resident is between .2 and 8, and occupancy is between 25% and 120%. 8 New pressure sores and new restraints mean that the resident did not have a pressure sore or orders for restraints on admission, respectively. Stage I pressure sores are excluded. 9 Nurse staffing costs include wages and fringe benefits for CNAs, LPNs, and RNs. 10 Nontherapy ancillary costs (e.g., pharmaceuticals) exhibit much higher variation across nursing facility residents than do staffing costs (White, Pizer and White 2002 ). An outlier provision, therefore, would serve mainly as protection for the nursing facility against unusually high nontherapy ancillary costs.
